TSA failure rates in detecting guns and bombs are so bad that the government says that the results are classified

If you have a "70 percent failure rate" in detecting guns and bombs, might the resources be better spent someplace else? Might their be other approaches? The whole process reminds one of why you don't want government doing these things. A private company that wasn't unionized would probably more closely tie the quality of performance with salary. These jobs might be boring, but you can still do things to improve performance.

According to one report, undercover TSA agents testing security at a Newark airport terminal on one day in 2006 found that TSA screeners failed to detect concealed bombs and guns 20 out of 22 times. A 2007 government audit leaked to USA Today revealed that undercover agents were successful slipping simulated explosives and bomb parts through Los Angeles's LAX airport in 50 out of 70 attempts, and at Chicago's O'Hare airport agents made 75 attempts and succeeded in getting through undetected 45 times. . . . .